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Abstract
Background: We examined the clinical and epidemiological characteristics of 30 cases of human infection with
avian influenza A(H7N9) virus in Hangzhou and investigated their external environments to provide evidence for
contact tracing and disease prevention and control.
Methods: The cases confirmed from April 1 through May 1, 2013 were studied. Field epidemiologic surveys were
conducted to collect the clinical and epidemiologic data. Case-related and environmental specimens were collected
for etiologic detection.
Results: Thirty cases of human infection with avian influenza A(H7N9) virus were confirmed in Hangzhou from April
1 through May 1, 2013, including one pregnant woman and three deaths. The median age of the patients was 62 years
(range: 38–86 years). Twenty-three of the patients were men (76.67%). The median duration between disease onset and
occurrence of respiratory failure and confirmed diagnosis was 5 and 6 days, respectively. Maximum medical observation
of 666 close contacts of the patients revealed no irregularity. Of 314 external environmental specimens, the overall
positive detection rate of H7N9 nucleic acid was 28.98%. Eight districts of Hangzhou city had positive detections in the
external environments, the highest rate being in Yuhang District (78.13%). Statistical analysis of the specimen collection
locations indicates a significant difference between the case-linked locations and the non-case locations (χ2 = 16.563,
p < 0.05) in terms of H7N9 viral nucleic acid detection rate. No epidemiologic link has been found among the 30 cases.
Conclusions: Most of the infected were retired individuals aged 60 years or older. Men made the majority. The cases
are sporadic at present, with no evidence of human-to-human transmission. Exposures to poultry and live poultry
markets may be important sources of infection.
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Background
China reported the first events of human infection with
H7N9 avian influenza A(H7N9) virus in March 2013.
The virus has been proved to be a novel strain, the first
of its kind ever found to infect humans, which was pre-
viously found only in wild bird populations. Avian influ-
enza has caused frequent epidemics in humans and
animals in recent years, the H5N1 avian influenza in
2005 and the novel H7N9 human influenza epidemic in
2013 in particular, which draws global attention. The
avian influenza viruses isolated from domestic fowl and
wild birds in many Asian, African and European countries
not only cause devastating damage to the avian industries
but pose a severe threat to public health of humanity
[1-5]. Studies have revealed such viral strains as H7N1,
H7N2, H7N3, H7N4, and H7N7 to cause outbreaks of
avian influenza, which led to mass culling of over 75
million domestic birds [1]. Over the last few decades,
researchers have realized that avian influenza viruses may
be linked with human infections, primarily transmitted
from domestic birds to humans directly [3,6-9]. Infections
and deaths attributed to the H9N2 [6], H7N3 [10], H7N2
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[11], H7N7 [12], and H5N1 strains [7] have been reported
globally. In March 2013 cases of human infection with
avian influenza A(H7N9) virus were first reported in
Shanghai and Anhui province of China, followed by cases
in the surrounding cities and provinces. Most of the cases
were severe with high fatality. By 17:00 May 1, 2013 China
had reported a total of 129 confirmed cases, including 31
deaths, 42 recoveries, and 56 patients currently treated at
designated facilities. By far the cases have been sporadic
except for the household clusters found in Shanghai and
Beijing. Of the 46 confirmed cases in Zhejiang province,
30 were found in Hangzhou city, including one pregnant
woman and three deaths. In characterizing the cases to
support future prevention and control, we report the clin-
ical and epidemiologic characteristics of the 30 Hangzhou
cases and their environmental test findings.
Methods
Field epidemiologic surveys were launched to attain the
patients’ clinical and epidemiologic data, including their
demographic information, disease onset, medical manage-
ment, clinical presentations, dwelling environments and
exposures, domestic fowl keeping, living habits and cus-
toms, past histories, possible sources of infection, trans-
mission routes, and exposure factors. Close contacts of
the patients were placed on medical observation. Informed
consent to participate in the study was obtained from all
the involved individuals. The current work was approved
by the Hangzhou Center for Disease Control Ethics Com-
mittee (approval number: 47011685-X).
The epidemiologic surveys were carried out by epidemi-
ologists from Hangzhou city and the local districts and
counties, following the Prevention and Control Protocol for
Human Infections with Avian Influenza A(H7N9) (1st Edi-
tion) [13] issued by the National Health and Family Plan-
ning Commission (NHFPC). Throat swabs were collected
from the patients and close contacts, which were packed
and shipped, following the appropriate national bio-safety
regulations, to the Influenza Monitoring Network labora-
tory for etiologic studies within 24 hours. All of the throat
swabs were collected during standard medical care.
Definitions
Human avian influenza A(H7N9) case: the cases were
categorized as suspected cases and confirmed cases ac-
cording to the Diagnosis and Treatment Protocol for
Human Infections with Avian Influenza A (H7N9) (1st
and 2nd Editions, 2013) [14,15].
Suspected case: a patient whose clinical symptoms are
consistent with acute influenza (fever, cough, coryza, dif-
ficulty breathing) and laboratory test result positive for
infection with an untyped influenza A virus or who has
a contact history with a confirmed or suspected case.
Confirmed case: a patient whose clinical symptoms are
consistent with acute influenza (fever, cough, coryza, diffi-
culty breathing) or who has a contact history with a con-
firmed or suspected case and a laboratory test positive for
avian influenza A (H7N9) virus; PCR, viral isolation or a
four-fold or greater increase in serum antibodies specific
for the H7N9 virus isolated in paired sera.
Close contact: a medical worker or a relative of patient
who gave care for a suspected or confirmed patient with-
out proper personal protections; an individual who lived
or had close contact with a suspected or confirmed patient
between onset and isolation of the patient; and any other
individual identified by field investigator to qualify for
inclusion.
Case-linked location: live poultry markets in a district,
which the confirmed patients had visited over the last two
weeks, were chosen for collection of case-linked specimens.
Non-case location: live poultry markets in the same
district, which the confirmed patients had not visited
over the last two weeks, were chosen for collection of
non-case specimens.
Exposure to live poultry market: visitation to a live
poultry market (either a retail or wholesale market)
within two weeks prior to disease onset, especially pres-
ence within 1 m from a stall where live poultry was sold
or slaughtered.
Exposure to poultry: direct or indirect contact with
any poultry or poultry product within two weeks prior
to disease onset, including purchasing, cleaning, cooking
and eating of suchproducts [16].
Environmental specimen collection: environmental speci-
mens such as poultry feces, anal swabs, throat swabs, drink-
ing water, waste water, and feather smears were collected.
Specimen collection location: the specimens were mainly
collected from live poultry markets, poultry keeping house-
holds of patients and their adjacent environments, poultry
farms and poultry keeping households adjacent to patient
households. The specimen collection locations in a live
poultry market included case-linked and non-case loca-
tions. At least one nearby live poultry markets were chosen
as a non-case location for each case-linked location.
Severe case: a confirmed case with pneumonia compli-
cated by respiratory failure or failure of other organs.
Laboratory testing
Results of routine blood tests, biochemical examinations
and chest radiography were attained from the medical
laboratories of the designated facilities. RNeasy Mini Kit
(QIAGEN) was used to extract viral RNA for etiologic
studies. Real-time retroviral-transcription polymerase chain
reaction (RT-PCR) (Real-time PCR System, ABI7500) was
used for viral subtyping. The primers and probes
for testing H7N9 viral nucleic acid were developed by
the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention
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(China CDC) according to the specific H7N9 virus gene
sequences and distributed to the Influenza Monitoring
Network labs all over the country.
Statistical analysis
SPSS11.0 was used for statistical analysis. Enumeration
data were expressed in frequencies and percentage. Rate
differences were examined by Pearson χ2 test with a test
level α = 0.05. The Geographic Information System (GIS)




Temporal, spatial and demographic distribution of disease
Over the 31 days by 16:00 May 1, 2013, a total of 153 cases
of severe pneumonia had been reported in Hangzhou.
After the cases of infection with bacteria, fungus, myco-
plasma pneumoniae, chlamydia, common influenza virus,
parainfluenza virus, syncytial virus or adenovirus were
ruled out, the clinically suspicious H7N9 cases were sub-
typed with RT-PCR; 123 cases were excluded, and 30 cases
of human infection with avian influenza A(H7N9) virus
were confirmed. The case patients were in severe condi-
tions with rapid progression. Three of the patients died
(fatality rate: 10.00%), five were discharged on recovery,
and the remaining patients were treated at designated
facilities. See Figure 1.
By May 1, 2013, H7N9 cases had been confirmed in nine
of the 13 local districts and counties of Hangzhou city,
including eight cases from Shangcheng District, five
from Xiaoshan District, five from Jianggan District, four
from Xiacheng District, three from Xihu District, two
from Yuhang District, and one case from Gongshu Dis-
trict, Jiande County and Lin’an County, respectively. See
Table 1 and Figure 2.
Twenty-three of the 30 confirmed case patients were
men (male:female ratio: 3.29:1). The patients’ ages ranged
from 35–86 years (median: 62.0 years). A large fraction of
the patients were retired (11 cases, 36.67%), followed by
farmers (6 cases, 20.00%) by occupation. See Table 1 and
Figure 3.
Exposure history
Twenty-seven (90.00%) of the 30 confirmed patients had
definitive exposure histories, including 14 patients with
exposures both to poultry and to live poultry markets,
11 only to live poultry markets, and two only to poultry.
The remaining three patients’ exposure histories were
indefinitive (One of the patients denied any exposure in
his residential environment though the ground floor of
the building he lived in was a live poultry market. The
other two had no definitive histories of exposure to
poultry or live poultry market). Analysis of travel histor-
ies revealed that three patients had traveled to other
places, including two going to the neighboring Jiangsu
province and one to a neighboring city in Zhejiang prov-
ince where he had contact with poultry locally. See Table 1.
Close contacts
A total of 666 close contacts were identified, including
377 medical workers, 160 family members and relatives
and 129 other individuals. During a 7-day medical obser-
vation and health follow-up, three of the close contacts
had a fever and 47 exhibited respiratory symptoms such
as sore throat and cough. Test results of the 50 symp-
tomatic close contacts were negative for H7N9 avian
influenza A(H7N9) viral infection. During the medical
observation 164 throat swab specimens were collected
from the asymptomatic close contacts, and the test re-
sults were negative for H7N9 viral nucleic acid. The
medical observation was lifted after seven days.
Figure 1 Reporting times of cases of human infection with avian influenza A(H7N9) virus in Hangzhou.
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Clinical characteristics
Clinical characteristics, diagnosis and management
The initial symptoms of the 30 confirmed cases were
primarily cough and fever (25/30 cases, 83.33%). The
median time was 1 day between onset and presentation
to a clinic, 4 days between onset and first hospitalization,
5 days between onset and occurrence of respiratory fail-
ure, and 6 days between onset and confirmed diagnosis.
Diagnosis of the first case was confirmed five days fol-
lowing the patient’s death. See Table 2.
Incubation period
Twelve of the 30 confirmed cases had definitive times of
exposure to live poultry and/or live poultry market, nine
of whom had single exposure time points (incubation
period: 1–14 days, median: 7 days) and three had contin-
ual exposure time points before onset (incubation period:
1–7 days in two cases, 4–7 days in one case). Of the
remaining 18 cases, 15 had continual exposures between
onset and hospital admission, whose exposure times could
not be established for incubation period calculation. No
definitive history of exposure to live poultry market was
documented for the other three cases.
External environmental detection
Overall viral detection in live poultry and environmental
specimens
A total of 314 specimens were collected from the envi-
ronments of live poultry markets, large poultry farms and
poultry keeping households in Hangzhou, including 159
specimens (50.64%) from the live poultry markets, 83
(26.43%) from the poultry keeping patietn households, 48
(15.29%) from the poultry farms and 24 (7.64%) from
Table 1 Epidemiologic characteristics of 30 confirmed
H7N9 cases in Hangzhou
Characteristics Confirmed cases (N = 30)
Age range (median) (yr) 35.0 - 86.0 (62.0)










History of exposure to poultry or
live poultry market/N (%)
27 (90.00)
Exposure mode/N (%)
Both exposure to poultry and
live poultry market
14 (46.67)
Only exposure to live poultry market 11 (36.66)
Only exposure to poultry 2 (6.67)
Unclear 3 (10.00)
Travel history/N (%) 3 (10.00)
Close contract/N (%)
Medical worker 386 (57.96)
Family and relative 163 (24.47)
Others 117 (17.57)
Figure 2 Geographic distribution of cases of human infection with avian influenza A(H7N9) virus in Hangzhou.
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other sources. Ninety-one specimens (28.98%) tested posi-
tive for H7N9 viral nucleic acid, most of which were from
the live poultry markets.
Viral detection in different types of specimens from live
poultry markets
See Table 3 for positive detections in different types of
specimens from the live poultry markets. Of the 159 live
poultry market specimens, 80 tested positive (overall
positive rate: 50.31%) for H7N9 avian influenza viral nu-
cleic acid. According to Table 3, among the specimens
collected from the markets, the case-related ones saw a
markedly higher positive rate compared with the non-
case specimens, where the Pearson χ2 test results indi-
cate a statistically significant difference (χ2 = 16.563, p <
0.05). Another 17 throat swab specimens were collected
from exposed poultry workers, all of which tested nega-
tive for H7N9 viral nucleic acid. None of the 17 poultry
workers exhibited flu-like respiratory symptoms such as
fever and cough.
Environmental viral detection in local districts and counties
So far H7N9 avian influenza nucleic acid has been de-
tected in the environments in eight local districts and
counties, with the highest positive detection rate in
Yuhang District (78.13%).
Disease onset after suspension of live poultry trade
Live poultry trade was suspended throughout Hangzhou
city on April 16, with the environments in the markets
disinfected for seven consecutive days. The last case was
reported on April 27. The exposure times of the previ-
ous cases were reportedly prior to April 16, suggesting
the control measures to be effective.
Influenza surveillance
There are 14 influenza surveillance sentinels in Hangzhou,
including two national surveillance hospitals and 12 desig-
nated hospitals at the city level. The flu surveillance find-
ings over Weeks 14–17 (from March 31 through April 27)
indicate that the percentage of influenza-like illnesses (ILI
%) rose considerably on Weeks 14 and 15 and dropped
slightly on Weeks 16 and 17, without an outbreak of clus-
ter cases. A marked increase is noted when compared with
the same period two years ago. A total of 110 specimens
from mild flu-like cases were sent to the sentinel facilities
Figure 3 Gender and age distributions of cases of human infection with avian influenza A(H7N9) virus in Hangzhou.
Table 2 Clinical features, diagnosis and management of
30 confirmed H7N9 cases in Hangzhou
Variable Confirmed case (N = 30)





Use of artificial liver/(N,%) 7 (23.33)
Use of artificial lung/(N,%) 5 (16.67)








Duration between disease onset and
First hospital visit/median (range, days) 1 (0–19)
First hospitalization/median (range, days) 4 (0–19)
Transfer to provincial-level hospital/median
(range, days)
5 (3–21)
Occurrence of respiratory failure/median
(range, days)
5 (3–11)
Confirmed diagnosis/median (range, days) 6 (4–21)
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for testing on Weeks 14–17, none of which tested positive
for H7N9 influenza, 7.27% were found with H1N1 and
8.18% with H3N2 avian influenza viruses. See Figure 4.
Discussion
A total of 30 confirmed cases of human inflection with
avian influenza A(H7N9) virus were reported in Hangzhou
between April 1 and May 1, 2013, including 12 moderate
and four severe cases. The clinical characteristics were
consistent with the other cases reported in China [17-19].
The time series of disease progression indicate rapid pro-
gressive aggravation of severe pneumonia. The results of
the current study are in alignment with the median dur-
ation before hospitalization reported by QIAN Fang, where
the patients also experienced rapid progression [20].
As a newly emerging infectious disease, human infection
with H7N9 avian influenza virus has drawn high attention
in the professional and international communities. Timely
detection is of grave importance for prevention and con-
trol measures. The 30 cases of human inflection with
avian influenza A(H7N9) virus in Hangzhou were found
by medical facilities through surveillance and screening of
pneumonia of unknown cause and reported via the Online
Direct Reporting System.
In further understanding the possible sources of infec-
tion and assessing risks of human infection, environ-
mental specimens were collected from the live poultry
markets that the patients and their family had visited as
well as from poultry workers, close contacts of patients,
and flu-like cases for etiologic studies. Pearson χ2 test re-
sults indicate a statistically significant difference (χ2 =
16.563, p < 0.05) between the case-related environmental
specimens and the non-case specimens in terms of
H7N9 viral nucleic acid positive rate. None of the close
contacts manifested progressively aggravating flu-like or
pneumonic symptoms. This suggests that virus activity
may exist in absence of an animal outbreak in the live
poultry markets. Information on the virus-bearing ani-
mals, contaminated environments, pathogenic homology
and the exposure history of population makes possible a
general portrait of the chain of transmission. Testing and
medical observation of close contacts have so far yielded
no evidence of human-to-human transmission. Etiologic
monitoring of outpatients with flu-like symptoms has
Table 3 Detection of H7N9 nucleic acid in environmental specimens from live poultry markets
Type of
specimen
Case-related specimens Non-case specimens
Tested N H7N9+ N + rate (%) Tested N H7N9+ N + rate (%)
Feces 13 10 76.92 10 2 20.00
Anal swab 15 9 60.00 - - -
Throat swab 10 5 50.00 1 1 100.00
Drinking water - - - 8 3 37.50
Waste water 13 5 38.46 6 2 33.33
Feather smear 16 11 68.75 5 2 40.00
Cage smear 7 5 71.43 17 5 29.41
Others 16 13 81.82 22 7 31.82
Total 90 58 64.44 69 22 31.88
Note: −: no specimen of the type available; in the specimens collected from the live poultry markets, the positive rate for H7N9 nucleic acid was markedly higher
in the case-related specimens than in the non-case ones with a statistically significant difference by Pearson χ2 test (χ2 = 16.563, p < 0.05).
Figure 4 Percentage of cases of influenza-like illness: Hangzhou, 2011–2013.
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documented no mild cases of H7N9 infection. However,
as the monitoring employed throat swabbing, the re-
sults might be less sensitive compared with serologic
testing and further evidence, serologic test results for
example, may be needed.
Exposure mode investigation indicates that most pa-
tients were retired elderlies, who visited live poultry
markets on a daily basis to purchase food ingredients,
including live poultry products. It is a common practice
in China that live poultry is slaughtered on site of pur-
chase in the market to ensure freshness, which is believed
to keep the food tasty. As a result, it was likely that the pa-
tients were repeatedly exposed in the less hygienic markets
for significant periods of time, who were in immediate
contact with live fowl and freshly slaughtered poultry
products without appropriate nose and hand protections.
Sustained exposures in the live poultry markets makes
calculation of incubation period difficult. Fifteen of the
Hangzhou cases had continual exposures between disease
onset and hospitalization, where the exact valid exposure
time points could not be determined to calculate the incu-
bation periods. However, definitive time points of expos-
ure to live poultry and/or the environments of live poultry
markets before disease onset were available for 12 cases,
including nine cases with single exposure time points,
based on which the incubation period was calculated to be
1–14 days (median: 7 days), which is longer than that of
avian influenza H5N1 in China. A study by HUAI Y in-
dicates that based on the exposure and onset data of 24
confirmed H5N1 cases, the median incubation period of
H5N1 avian influenza in China is calculated to be 5 days
(range: 2–9.5 days) [21]. A more accurate incubation
period of H7N9 may be determined by investigating the
127 confirmed cases countrywide in China.
At the moment, H7N9 cases are sporadic and scattered
events except for the household clusters found in Shang-
hai and Beijing, and the main source of infection remains
unclear [22]. The current work may not have covered all
possible sources of infection. Despite a thorough infection
source investigation carried out by a joint survey team, the
sources of three confirmed cases remain undetermined. A
similar situation was seen in an H5N1 study in Guang-
dong province, China [23].
The H7N9 PCR positive rate was the highest in the en-
vironmental specimens from Yuhang District, where only
two cases were confirmed. In contrast, the other districts
saw more cases despite lower environmental detection
rates, Shangcheng District for instance, where eight cases
were found while the environmental positive rate was
lower. Yuhang is the largest district of Hangzhou city,
where two major designated markets supply more than
half of the live poultry for the rest of the city. Compared
with Yuhang District, the population in the other districts
is less dense. Additionally, the live poultry vendors are
mixed with other food stalls, which the people in the other
district visit on a daily basis. This might explain the higher
environmental detection rate with fewer cases in Yuhang
District.
According to the existing data, the main route of trans-
mission is believed to be avian-to-human. The sources of
infection could be exposures to live poultry markets. The
mode of infection remains unclear. Humans generally lack
immunity to the novel infectious disease and effective
immunization is currently unavailable. Therefore, cutting of
the chain of transmission and effective environment disin-
fection and isolation measures seem particularly important.
Limitations
There are two limitations to the current work: 1. environ-
mental specimen collection in the districts where cases
were found earlier might have been affected by control in-
terventions. For instance, early regular disinfection of live
poultry markets and other control measures took place in
Shangcheng District. This might have caused sampling er-
rors; and 2. the study was not case–control, which may be
conducted in future outbreaks to determine the risk factors.
Conclusions
Most of the infected were retired individuals aged 60 years
or older. Men made the majority. The cases are sporadic
at present, with no evidence of human-to-human trans-
mission. Exposures to poultry and live poultry markets
may be important sources of infection.
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